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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-010-9234-7

Originally published at:
Andorno, Roberto (2010). Short literature notices. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 13(2):181-187.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-010-9234-7

Med Health Care and Philos (2010) 13:181–187
DOI 10.1007/s11019-010-9234-7

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R. Andorno

Published online: 12 February 2010

Marcum, J.A.: *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine*. Milton Keynes, U.K.: Springer, 2008. 369 pages. ISBN 978-1402067969. Price: £ 94.50.

There are actually not too many introductory books in the field of philosophy of medicine. To meet this need, James Marcum, a philosopher of science with a background in physiology, has written *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine*, with the subtitle *Humanizing Modern Medicine*. The main title is promising and clear but the subtitle is obscure, at least until the author's agenda is clarified in the first few pages.

Marcum opens with a general discussion about the nature of philosophy of medicine. The very clear introduction builds, for example, upon Edmund Pellegrino's distinction between a philosophy *in* medicine, a philosophy *of* medicine, and a third relationship, philosophy *and* medicine. Marcum seems to agree with William Stempsey who has noted that there has "always been a philosophy lurking behind medical thought and practice". The rest of the book is divided into three parts, which examine the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical foundations of medicine. Practically everything in this vast area is covered at least briefly. The approach is *top-down*, that is, philosophical theory is introduced first and its implications to medical practice are shortly discussed later.

There are two major problems that interfere with the joy of reading this book. Firstly, a crisis in the quality of care is presented as a starting point. Such a crisis is, however, far too easily taken for granted and neither defined nor described. Whether such a crisis exists or not is an *empirical* question and should be treated as such. Where is the evidence, for example, that the quality of care at some previous point in time has been higher than it is today?

Secondly, a dichotomy between *biomedicine* and *humane medicine* is presented as another starting point. The source of (almost) all problems is the biomedical model, according to which "the patient is a machine composed of individual body parts that, when broken or lost, can be fixed or replaced by new parts". A physician working in the context of this model chooses the therapeutic modality, "often with little patient consultation", and sees death as a defeat that should be avoided at all costs. The medical profession "values emotionally detached concern or a chastened or masculinized form of empathy over genuine or authentic empathic care". Luckily, the world can be saved by the recently emerged humanistic or humane models of medicine. Here the author has built a straw man—"biomedical practitioner"—and gives his sympathies to the brave "humanistic practitioner" in the fight over the future of medicine. But the medical world is not that simple and the dichotomy is, instead, more annoying than helpful.

These two problems are not minor in a book written by a philosopher of science who specialises in philosophy of medicine. It is, however, possible to read the book and simply leave these issues aside. Essentially, it is a rich source book, as the back cover proclaims: "the book's unique features include a comprehensive coverage of the various topics in the philosophy of medicine that have emerged over the past several decades and a philosophical context for embedding bioethical discussions". This is certainly true, and the author is to be congratulated. Contrary to another claim on the back cover, however, I am sceptical about the book's suitability for textbook purposes,

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at least for undergraduate courses. There is simply far too much material for beginners.

Pekka Louhiala
Helsinki, Finland

Kuppuswamy, C.: *The International Legal Governance of the Human Genome*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. 210 pages. ISBN 978-0-415-45857-3. Price: £75.

In this book, Kuppuswamy identifies the human genome as a milestone step in scientific progress and seeks to describe and criticise governance frameworks applied to it which may lead to inequality in a number of different settings. She argues that in order to govern the human genome in a meaningful way, a unified theory of human rights must be advanced and distinctions between positive and negative rights set aside.

Kuppuswamy's book is divided into six parts and a conclusion. Initially, she focuses on the human genome and bioethics before describing the connection between international organisations and the human genome. Parts three and four discuss the concept of common heritage of mankind concept, and part five puts this notion into the context of human rights. Part six investigates the common heritage in relation to intellectual property rights. The conclusion spans seven pages and is followed by an annex (the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights). Some of Kuppuswamy's chapter structuring takes getting used to and it is still not immediately clear why the annex was necessary, particularly given the easy accessibility of such texts online. Her initial discussion of bioethics seems to unfortunately only scrape the surface. In particular, there may be plausible diverging opinions in relation to her assertion, following Kaplan, that bioethics emerged from the ashes of the holocaust. Far more convincing is Miola's well-argued point that the Nuremberg Trials were simply a *renaissance* rather than a *naissance* of ethics in this field (cf. Miola (2007) Medical Ethics and Medical Law—A Symbiotic Relationship. Hart, Oxford). It is also a valid question which remains unanswered whether bioethics and medical ethics are easily equated. Kuppuswamy may have done her otherwise well-argued book a disservice by not delving into sufficient depth here, though the narrow remit of the text may justify the brevity of her exploration of bioethics.

Overall, Kuppuswamy writes with great clarity and accessibility and the book is a worthwhile read. She is quite right in identifying human rights concepts as pivotal in any regime aimed at governing subjects (or indeed objects!) of international law of the magnitude of the human genome. The proposal forwarded by her in this book is an excellent addition to literature addressing different notions of viewing property in relation to new science. Whilst it is certainly recommended reading for scholars working in this area, the high price of the volume may dissuade some.

Nils Hoppe
Hanover, Germany

Tealdi, J.C. (ed.): *Diccionario Latinoamericano de Bioética*. Bogotá: UNESCO- Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Bioética- Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2008. 657 pages. ISBN 978-9587019742. Price: COL $ 90. Freely available online at: http://www.unesco.org.uy/shs/es/areas-de-trabajo/ciencias-sociales/bioetica/documentos-publicaciones-en-bioetica.html.

This volume, published under the auspices of UNESCO's Bioethics Network for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the editorial leadership of Juan Carlos Tealdi, presents an updated overview of Latin American culture and tradition, as they pertain to bioethics and allied disciplines like philosophy, sociology, anthropology and psychology. Written by over 150 scholars from 16 regional countries, this major academic effort has resulted in a unique and comprehensive text that goes way beyond the semantic function of a dictionary, to fulfill the task of a conceptual encyclopedia. Selecting authors according to their expertise and commitment was far from simple, considering the substantial variety in size, resources, academic development and dedication to bioethics and the humanities of the countries that constitute the Spanish and Portuguese speaking Latin American nations.

The *Diccionario* has 27 sections, with alphabetically ordered titles ranging from "Bioethics" to "Liberty", from "Human Body" to "Knowledge and Truth". Each section includes a number of entries covering a variety of topics that combine the specific and current concerns of bioethics, with cultural themes that are of major importance in the history and social reality of Latin America. Among the 234 entries, the reader finds contributions discussing regional philosophy, indigenous oral tradition, politics, human rights, research ethics including exploitation and biopiracy. Equal importance is given to particular bioethical issues like reproductive health, unsafe abortion, euthanasia, maternal mortality, medical decision-taking. In dealing with these specific topics, most authors have judiciously presented the current international state of the debate in addition to discussing local realities and conceptual trends, as shown by the balanced mix of regional and international references at the end of each entry.

Latin America has a long history of colonial oppression and political unrest often leading to prolonged and extremely harsh dictatorships. Since conspicuous socioeconomic

disparities tend to prevail, social tension surfaces from time to time as the better off cling to their privileges, ethnic groups defend their roots and rights, and cultural diversity seeks tolerance, respect and support. Latin American bioethics reflects these contextual realities, being more concerned with justice than autonomy, state responsibility in health care and demanding remedial policies to reduce poverty, need and marginalization. Autochthonous perspectives have emerged and are duly covered in the *Diccionario*: bioethics of intervention endorsing political engagement, ethics of protection encouraging empowerment to face social and environmental challenges, ethics of liberation in search of justice, emphasis on human rights and the dignity of human beings in an effort to prevent exploitation and abusive domination.

Latin American bioethics and the realities that inspire its themes and practices are presented in a vivid, scholarly and elegant way. The wealth of insider information will hopefully overcome the shallow, birds-eye view of external observers and, since dictionaries are by definition not translatable, scholars from highly developed countries are urged to seek linguistic assistance in order not to miss this highly commendable intellectual effort.

Miguel Kottow
Santiago, Chile

Lyall, C., Papaioannou, T., and Smith, J. (eds.): *The Limits to Governance: The Challenge of Policy-Making for the New Life Sciences*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009. 300 pages. ISBN: 978-0754675082. Price: £60.

This edited volume is turning the debate about the 'limits of the state' into the question about *what limits governance*. By making an important step in bringing an old discussion to new frontiers, the book seeks to offer a critique of the "new" (although not as new) governance agenda, according to which the informal authority of policy networks and non-governmental actors replaces the formal authority of 'government'. In an excellent literature review on governance, the editors make the case that the move from government to governance presents problems of accountability, transparency and legitimacy. Exclusive policy networks can, in practice, reduce open democratic debate, as compromises are negotiated between interested parties outside established political processes and institutions. In three sections, structured around the 'principles', 'processes' and 'people' of governance, the book locates this debate in the context of the governance/government of the life sciences and genomics.

The various contributions all show that the life sciences still require a considerable mix of government and governance. Against the idea of a 'hollowing out of the state', the book's diagnosis is the co-existence of government and governance in a continuum, not in the sense that any policy situation is either government or governance, but rather as the possibility that the two co-exist any time. Its central message reads therefore that the challenge for the future of the life sciences is "to incorporate the most useful aspects of governance-based approaches and reconcile them with the still necessary systems of regulation in a way that does not exclude key stakeholders—such as the pharmaceutical industry—from the policy debate" (p. 10).

While none of these observations are innovative or groundbreaking, the book's strength lies in the fact that it turns this problem into an object of more systematic study in a book, in the context of the life sciences and genomics, and in thorough empirical case studies ranging across different biotechnology applications and continents in Europe, America and with particular emphasis on Africa. Based on its strength, the book will certainly become a relevant reference book and student textbook in the field of genetics and society studies. Less convincing, however, are its theoretical advancements. It is arguable, whether the present-day study of 'governance' separates so strictly between non-governmental actors and policy networks as 'governance' and formal regulation and the resilience of the state as 'government'. Much rather it seems that governance is more often than not inclusive of both. Although governance implies the emergence of new actors and forms of participation, surely not many would agree that this has diminished the role of the state.

In the development of its critique, the book does unfortunately not succeed to make a substantial conceptual contribution to existing literature on governance, other than its delivery of empirical evidence in the various case studies. While it is true that the challenges for policy-making for the new life sciences cannot be tackled simply by greater consultation, as the book concludes, its call for wider inclusion of key stakeholders, e.g. the pharma-industry, can certainly also not be the answer. This is not particularly insightful, as it is not the case that these actors are excluded from policy networks, but what is more, as part of the 'problem', key stakeholders can certainly not resolve the future challenges of the life sciences.

Kerstin Klein
London, UK

Müller, O., Clausen, J., and Maio, G. (eds): *Das technisierte Gehirn. Neurotechnologien als Herausforderung für Ethik und Anthropologie*. Paderborn: Mentis, 2009. 507 pages. ISBN: 978-3897856295. Price: € 38.

The unanticipated success story of deep brain stimulation as a treatment of Parkinson's disease has sparked enormous

interest in technical neuromodulation and brain-computer interfaces generally. Researchers from neuroscience and engineering science strive to find ways to bring human neurons and computer chips together and make them communicate with one another. While the direct physical communication between neurons and chips is still a challenge for the future, there are already certain techniques that bridge the gap between the nervous system and machines—think of the electrodes in Parkinson patients' brains, the cochlea implant or sophisticated EEG programs that help paralyzed patients write sentences on the computer solely by their thoughts and their attention. How do these neurotechnologies shape our selves and our human nature? We are the ethical boundaries to developing and using these techniques?

Oliver Müller, Jens Clausen and Giovanni Maio now published a voluminous book on the anthropological and ethical questions surrounding the new neurotechnologies. They edited a collection of German articles written mostly by junior researchers who participated in a neuroethics summer school funded by the German Ministry of Education and Science. The merit of this publication is the multidisciplinary perspective ranging from Microsystems technology and medicine to psychology, philosophy and law.

The book is structured in thematic categories. In the first part, clinical researchers present exciting examples of neurotechnologies that are meant to sense and suppress epileptic seizures in the brain or move artificial limbs by the force of thoughts in locked-in patients. A second part focuses on sociocultural aspects including the economic dynamics of the new market for profitable neurotechnologies. The third and fourth section comprises articles that discuss ethical criteria and the problem of personhood in the context of neurotechnologies. One of the most interesting articles poses the question: what the latest neuroscientific insights into human morality can tell us about possible effects of neurotechnologies on humans as moral agents? May deep brain stimulation be one day used to improve our moral behaviour or shape the moral attitudes and actions of people? Another insightful article explores how the notion of responsibility could make sense in a world of neurotechnologies. Another section of the book concerns neurotechnological enhancement, and the last section discusses how the self image of human beings may be affected by these new technologies.

Overall, this is a comprehensive and thorough approach to ethical and anthropological questions raised by the new neurotechnologies that directly link brains and computers. Most articles are well written and clearly structured. Unfortunately, the introduction falls short of giving a good overview of the book's whole content, and a subject index at the end of the book is lacking. The difference between the new neurotechnologies and classic neurosurgery (or psychosurgery) is sometimes blurred and would be worth reflecting upon. The book is well suited for scholars in neuroscience, neuroethics and neurophilosophy, but may also be inspiring and thought-provoking for a wider (unfortunately only German-speaking) academic and public readership.

Ralf J. Jox
Munich, Germany

Evans, M., Ahlzén, R., Heath, I., Macnaughton, J. (eds.), *Medical Humanities Companion. Volume One: Symptom.* Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 2008. 136 pages. ISBN: 978-1846192869. Price: £21.95.

Medical Humanities Companion is a collective work starting in Volume One on "Symptom", with the editors' declared intention to ask questions about the meaning of actual symptoms and about the concept of "symptom" itself from a convergent range of disciplinary expertise, aiming to a genuine fusion of disciplinary insights, discourses and metaphors.

By means of the fictionalised stories of four patients who represent a variety of ages, symptom experiences and types of underlying clinical condition, the book collects simultaneously a cumulative interdisciplinary understanding of illness as a human need, and of clinical medicine as a human response to it.

Throughout the book, symptoms are examined under linguistic, semiotic and philosophical point of view. In Volume One, the authors are attempting to take the notion of symptom as a starting point for trying to take seriously the fusion of the material and the existential, that is, the conscious human experience.

The idea of a symptom is important for understanding the structure of clinical practice. Real, actual symptoms are always experienced by real, actual individuals –much of those experiences are mediated by language, culture, expectation and the conventions of the clinical consultation. It is necessary somehow to take seriously the patient's subjectivity. This means taking seriously the content of the patient's individual point of view, the way of life that has led up to the disease, the meanings and connotations that inform it, and the way it is shaped by other people. From the perspectives of clinical understanding and decision making, thoughts and attitudes of the patient are to be taken in account as seriously as the generalised truths about the human organism supplied by natural sciences. The natural sciences give us knowledge that defines the boundaries of rational conceptions of what people might do. However there is need to look elsewhere (to the humanities and

social sciences) to understand the basis of people's attitudes towards what they *should* do, and their motives for what they in fact do. Body and mind have to be related with wider strategies of comprehension, and symptom can be an effective trigger for going deeper inside through the overlapping cultural and biological layers which all together constitute the human being and his sufferings. Each chapter shows how different disciplines from medical humanities can offer supplementary tools in order to take care of the suffering individuals better than only curing their diseases. The goal of the book is only partially achieved because it remains in the field of the intellectual knowledge instead of enlightening the true meaning of "humanity". After such a sound analysis it would had been valuable to focus also on the real practice of humanity in medical care, and what role it can play in the improvement of the doctor-patient relationship.

Rossana Becarelli
Turin, Italy

Have, H. ten, Jean, M. (eds.): *The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Background, principles and application*. Paris: UNESCO, 2009. 370 pages. ISBN: 978-9231040887. Price: € 26.

This book is a veritable feast. It contains chapters authored mostly by members of the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee (IBC) who were themselves intimately involved in the development of this important but challenging international instrument. The 15 ethical principles in the Declaration (articles 3–17) are addressed by 26 authors (many from Europe, one from the US, and the rest from around the world) who responded to 3 questions pertaining to the reasons why the article was included in the Declaration, its meaning in the context of the Declaration, and how it might be applied. The editors, Henk ten Have and Michele Jean, are both world renowned scholars, the former a physician with a strong background in philosophy, who headed UNESCO's Division of Ethics of Science and Technology during the prolonged period of negotiations and development of the Declaration; the latter a historian and bioethicist from the University of Montreal, who chaired IBC between 2003 and 2005. In their preface they magnificently provide a historical background for the Declaration, including why and how UNESCO took on this incredibly challenging task.

The book resonated with me very much: in my clinical life, especially in organ transplantation; later at the University of Toronto's Joint Centre for Bioethics; in my current research on global health issues; and now as a member of the IBC I have had occasion to deal with almost all the issues in the Declaration, from the complex definitional issues around the concept of human dignity (Article 3); the apparently mundane but ever-changing issue of consent (Article 6); the still little known principle of "respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity" (Article 8); the currently very topical article (9) on the principle of privacy and confidentiality, which is now under severe challenge in the age of personalized genomics and the Internet (I recall the comment by Sun Microsystem's co-founder Bill Joy that "Privacy is dead. Get over it"); to Article 17 on "protecting the environment, the biosphere and biodiversity."

For me, however, the most important principle is discussed in Article 12 on the principle of "respect for cultural diversity and pluralism." The tension here is captured well in the observation that the IBC had to take into account on the one hand, cultural diversity, in that "ethical positions depend on the value system specific to each society in accordance with its cultural traditions", and, on the other, universality, because "the internationally recognized idea of universality on which human rights are funded is crucial to ethics". I think that the Declaration has managed to negotiate this delicate tension extremely well, without being so bland that it has little guiding value.

Although I joined the IBC after the Declaration was adopted by UNESCO's General Conference on 19th October 2005, I have since been involved in the further elaboration of the text, and am currently involved in work on Article 14 on "Social Responsibility and Health". In the process I have observed just how professionally, efficiently and responsibly Henk ten Have has managed the whole complex process, which not only calls for managerial skills but also diplomatic abilities. We all owe him a huge debt of gratitude for the enormous accomplishments in running the Division so well, managing the process of developing the Declaration, and the superb way in which he has set up the process of not only its further elaboration but also its dissemination, his encouragement of the establishment of national bioethics commissions/committees, and of the development of bioethics curricula and teaching materials based on this Declaration.

The book is a scholarly yet approachable document, as much history as bioethics per se, and I highly recommend it to all who have even a remote interest in this rapidly changing field- a moving feast that will keep traveling for a long time. Serious scholars of bioethics, especially those interested in the tension between universal values and local cultural determinants of ethics, will find this book extremely valuable.

Abdallah Daar
Toronto, Canada

Hardegger, J.: *Willenssache. Die Infragestellung der Willensfreiheit durch moderne Hirnforschung als Herausforderung für Theologie und Ethik*. Münster: LIT, 2009. 199 pages. ISBN 978-3643800145. Price: € 18.90.

The debate on free will is probably the most widely known and most publicly discussed aspect of neurobiological research. With her dissertation, Judith Hardegger has written a short, but comprehensive and very readable introduction.

She first discusses the provocation of neurobiology, based on the experiments of Benjamin Libet, their critique and extension by Haggard/Eimer and the consequences made popular by the publications of Roth and Singer: there is no free will; everything is determined by neural activities. The second part describes the critical reaction, not only philosophical and theological, but also by representatives in criminal law and neurobiologists themselves. The third part finally presents the author's own arguments against the deterministic challenge to free will: that human freedom is far from being unconditioned, but makes allowances for physical and above all neuronal constraints. In the very last ten pages she formulates an outlook of not to "throw out the baby with the bath water", but rather learn from neurobiological findings.

The strength of this book undeniably lies in its comprehensiveness. It comprises not only recent and more familiar philosophical responses such as by Peter Bieri and Michael Pauen, but also old arguments still worthy of consideration such as those by Max Planck in 1923. An informative chapter is the one on criminal law. It shows the familiarity of the author with the forensic aspect, as she has already co-authored a paper with Frank Urbaniok, psychiatrist and forensic expert witness. The reader might also find helpful the information on methodological and conceptual critique, coming from neuroscientists themselves. Often the debate is presented as "neurobiology against the humanities". But it is not just ethical or philosophical concerns that can be raised against neural determinism, there are also grave scientific objections, and it is the merit of this book to have pointed out some of them.

But this shows that the shortness of the book is its strength as well as its weakness. Arguments are often presented rather than discussed. The reader is left with different positions and has to make up his/her own mind. Sometimes one would wish for a more detailed treatment, rather than just juxtaposing arguments.

The author's own summary at the end explicitly proposes to refute neurobiological determinism on the grounds of inner inconsistency. It is not empirically falsifiable and therefore not scientific, but a question of belief ("Glaubenssatz"). Roth and Singer, however, would rightly object, that many scientific theories (among others evolutionary theory) are not empirically falsifiable. And likewise theologians would object, 'belief' is not primarily characterized by its failure to be falsified. Her further arguments are—against her own intent—consequentialistic: Without free will, personhood and dignity are lost, and moral relativism or materialism will spread.

The author's outlook is worth thinking about. We might have to generate new concepts bridging the gap between matter and mind. I have only my doubts about quantum theory being (once again) the silver bullet.

Christina Aus der Au
Basel, Switzerland

Bayle, B.: *À la poursuite de l'enfant parfait. L'avenir de la procréation humaine* Paris: Robert Laffont, 2009. 321 pages. ISBN: 9782221108192. Price: € 20.

This is the sixth book of Benoît Bayle, a clinical psychiatrist at a hospital in Chartres, France, and a Doctor of philosophy. The volume is devoted to a critical discussion of reproductive technologies in contemporary liberal societies, of its ideology, and its practice. The incentives as well as the justification of such technologies are often grounded in the "right" to have a child if and when it is desired; they follow the logics of embryo overproduction, embryo selection and embryo destruction. The principles and possible misuses of these procedures have been so far criticized mainly from the philosophical, theological and biological perspectives. The work of Bayle intends to explore the issue, and in particular, the humanity of the unborn child, from the viewpoint of psychology.

As a clinical psychiatrist, Bayle studies the prenatal period of the infant. His analysis demonstrates and displays the emergence of a psychopathological problematic from the very moment of conception. Thus he is being led to working out the notion of "conceptional identity." Nobody questions the child's genetic identity, determined by the fertilization of the maternal egg, thus being situated on a biological level. It does exist however also a "conceptional identity", thanks to which the human embryo enters at its very conception into the psychosocial domain. An embryo is "a being conceived by a man and a woman, at a certain moment of the history of humankind and at a certain place of the world" (p. 186). As soon as it is conceived, the embryo is not only a biological being: it is also, from the beginning, a psychological reality. His conceptional identity is determined by the conditions of his generation, his history and the identity of those who called him to life. A child conceived by a rape is suffering from an aggression against its dignity, an aggression which has a bearing on the very foundations of his identity. The being thus

conceived embodies during his whole life the trauma of his conception for those who are aware of it, as well as for himself, in case he learns about it. The mother not only continues to face the memory of the aggression, she also bears the child who so to say embodies this aggression and she relates to it according to this condition, i.e. as to a subjectivity which makes the aggressor present. However this does not yet mean to assert that the embryo would bear the material marks of the traumatism which gave to it its existence neither to assign to him self-consciousness. According to Bayle, the being in gestation embodies a history, it does possess an origin and a conceptional identity which confer to its biological body a specific subjectivity, and all these elements constitute a decisive element in the genesis of the prenatal relation between the mother and the child. In this sense, the prenatal period represents "a regular stage" of the psychological history of a human being (p. 225). This continuity is being illustrated in a spectacular way through the analogy between the disturbances observed in children born by in vitro fertilization and embryo selection, and those affecting the survivors of natural and technical catastrophes. The prenatal period is not only an authentic moment of the psychological genesis of an individual, it is also a sphere of the interaction with the mother. The baby the woman carries in her womb is like a graft to assimilate, to integrate into herself, and "the human being which is conceived does not simply take root in the maternal body, it also implants in the mother's psychism" (p. 227).

Bayle's studies contribute to a better understanding of the "psychological gestation", this early construction of the mother–child relationship of which they describe some misadventures, like the often-talked about "denial of pregnancy". The author's insistence on the integration of the prenatal period into the psychological gestation of a human being sheds light upon reproductive technologies' hidden premises. The self-justification of these procedures is finally grounded on the acceptance of a radical difference between those who are born and those who are not yet born. But the psychoanalysis of the prenatal period refutes this assumption. If however the embryo is not essentially different from the child who is born, why should not he or she possess the same human dignity which prescribes never to treat somebody as a means but always as an end of our action? This raises the question of the compatibility of the unborn child's dignity with the diverse reproductive technologies. In the same way as the design-baby "produced" to heal a sibling is an instrument because he is the object of an intervention carried out for the sake of someone else, the individuals called into existence to quench the desire for a child are not appreciated by themselves but as regarded as mere means. The autonomy of every human being combined with their participation into intersubjective exchanges reveals the truth of the human condition. At the same time, the will to call into existence another individual is mixed with the advent of him or her thanks to a natural process. With his theory of "conceptional identity" B. Bayle unveils the squalid message of reproductives technologies. To produce a desired child, one assumes the legitimacy of manipulations leading to the destruction of a multiplicity of human embryos. In this way, the child effectively called into existence is a being entirely dependent on the will of its authors. How could he thereafter strive for an autonomous existence, how could then he become himself? Reproductive technologies claim to provide us with a complete control of human fertility. They however omit to mention that this power risks leading to a degradation of the Other who is the child, by treating him as a mere instrument.

Miklos Vetö
Paris, France